Analysis: Gulf states diverge on security ties with Israel after Iranian attacks

The article examines whether Gulf Arab states will look to Israel as a security partner after what it describes as the American-Israeli war on Iran and Tehran’s retaliatory missile and drone attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council members. The piece states that while no GCC state is likely to break defense ties with Washington, the Gulf monarchies are almost certain to seek broader security partnerships. It says this trend predates February 28 and is now set to accelerate, driven by the Trump administration’s disregard for Gulf Arab officials’ warnings against attacking Iran and what the article calls America’s apparent indifference to their security interests.

The author writes that Israel naturally appeals to some Gulf monarchies seeking greater autonomy from the United States because of its military strength and intelligence capabilities, and that it may also offer indirect access to Washington’s decision-makers. Daniel Levy, president of the US/Middle East Project and a former Israeli negotiator, is cited as saying that the “Greater Israel” project aims beyond territorial expansion to position Israel as a necessary security partner by exploiting Gulf states’ fears of Iran. Karim Emile Bitar, a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po Paris, told RS that most Gulf countries have historically courted Israel to get closer to the Americans, with some competing to become Israel’s interlocutor in Washington.

The article stresses that Gulf monarchies do not share one view of Israel. Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are described as unfavorable to deepened cooperation with Tel Aviv. The United Arab Emirates has deepened its partnership with Israel and will likely expand cooperation in defense, security, and intelligence sharing, and Bahrain and possibly Kuwait may follow Abu Dhabi. Axios is reported on April 26 as saying that Israel secretly deployed an Iron Dome system with troops to the UAE early in the war, the first time the system was used outside Israel or the United States, and that it reportedly intercepted dozens of Iranian missiles targeting the UAE.

The article says Abu Dhabi perceives that fellow Arab countries and regional institutions offered insufficient support during the conflict. The author writes that, “fairly or not,” this view will probably prompt the UAE to strengthen its partnerships with Israel, the United States, and China, and may lead it to distance itself from Arab multilateralism after its recently announced departure from OPEC. Mira Al Hussein, a fellow at the Alwaleed Centre at the University of Edinburgh, told RS that the UAE “may diversify its security partners, but it will effectively move in parallel with Israel.” The article describes Bahrain, an Abraham Accords state increasingly reliant on Abu Dhabi, as likely to see Israel as an ever more valuable defense partner, given its geography, economic constraints, and sectarian dynamics (Proverbs 18:17).

On Kuwait, the article notes that the country has long opposed the Abraham Accords but that its current leadership may move toward a form of de facto normalization with Israel. Courtney Freer, an assistant professor at Emory University, told RS that with parliament dissolved, the state can more easily take a decision that has been unpopular publicly and made illegal by parliamentary legislation, though she argued that normalization would have to carry substantial defense benefits. The article says Saudi Arabia’s calculus differs because public opinion remains firmly opposed to closer ties with Israel. Bitar argued that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman “understands fully well that it would be very unpopular to accelerate this normalization process.”

The article reports that Qatar, which it says was bombed by Israel last year, sees both Tel Aviv and Tehran as threats. It is likely, the author writes, to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey while continuing cautious diplomatic engagement with Tehran.

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